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SUMMARY 
This study sets out to examine whether the "new'' provincial governments in South 
Africa are in practice functioning as "quasi-federal" power bases. The study starts with 
an appraisal of the core constitutional concepts critical to provincial government as a 
prelude to the enquiry into the practical status of the provincial governments. 
An enquiry is made into the application of certain provisions of the interim Constitution 
pertaining to provincial government. Thereafter certain provisions of the final 
Constitution pertaining to provincial government are compared with the corresponding 
provisions of the interim Constitution. The issue of provincial powers in practice and the 
problems experienced by provincial governments are also dealt with. The study 
concludes that provincial governments are currently not functioning as "quasi-federal" 
power bases and that it is even doubtful whether that situation will present itself in the 
foreseeable future. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
An underlying source of tension throughout the constitutional negotiation process (which 
started after FW de Klerk's opening of Parliament speech on 2 February 1990) has been 
the degree of federalism to be "allowed" within a unitary, democratic South Africa. 1 The 
adopted interim Constitution, 2 as evidenced in particular from the Constitutional 
Principles, adhered (in theory at least) to the principle of federalism. 3 It will nevertheless 
be shown in this dissertation that federalism as env\§(;3g~~gjn .tbe interim Constitution ha,s 
~---~-·----·-,~<· , ~-'" . ,>("/ 
no!_ t?e.E?n realised fully in practice with regard tp.provin~iaj gqyern1J1ent. 4 
The major political parties, with the exception of the ANC, regarded a federal power base as 
indispensable for a greater measure of power sharing, as a "matter of dividing up spheres of 
competence","to provide a political process for working out competences and conflict" and for 
keeping the government in check. In short, federalism was not dealt with from a purely 
constitutional point of departure but rather on the basis of political expedience. See in this regard 
Klaaren "Federalism" in Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa(1996) 5-1, De Villiers 
"The Federal/Unitary debate: Is there light at the end of the tunnel?" 1996 The Human Rights and 
Constitutional Law Journal of Southern Africa 9 et seq. Although the ANC was from the outset 
not supportive of the federal cause a certain "softening" of this stance became necessary in the 
course of constitutional negotiations at Kempton Park. See in this regard Cilliers "The Prospects 
for Federalism in South Africa" Responsa Meridiana 1995 477-478 who describes any concession 
on the part of the ANC as "either out of necessity or because of strategic reasons". For an 
overview of the various political parties stances see Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South 
Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) 12 -21 and their cited sources. 
2 200 of 1993. 
3 See Klaaren in fn 1 who states that "it is most accurate to describe it [the Constitution] as a 
federal system with unitary features" (at 5 -1). 
4 Since this is a dissertation of limited scope only and the main focus of it is in any event not a 
theorisation on federalism per se, it is impossible to deal with the theoretical underpinnings of the 
concept of "federalism". The literature on the concept of "federalism" is vast, it deals with 
federalism in its so-called "pure" form, the variables necessitated by constitutional prerequisites, 
monetary constraints, et cetera. The most comprehensive source of information on the concept 
of "federalism" remains Elazar's vast output in this regard. See for example his Exploring 
Federalism (1987), Constitutional Design and Power-sharing in the Post-modern Epoch ( 1991) 
and Federalism: an overview (1995) and the sources cited by him in the publications. For 
federalism from an African perspective see Elaigwu Federalism and Nation-building in Nigeria: 
The challenges of the 21st century (1994). See too the various publications of the International 
Association of Centers for Federal Studies. 
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To serve as background for this enquiry into the practical application of some of the 
interim Constitution's provisions relating to provincial government5, a brief overview is 
given of the Gore CQ.Q.~titutional concepts that are critical to. provindalgovernance. The 
chosen concepts are: democracy~and"constitutionalism, separation of powers (including 
) $/_ .• , .. •'"' ~" ..... ,\ '\\ 
checks and balances) and 'ifederalism" as provided for in the Constitutional Principles 
" 
of the interim Constitution6• The case law on the issue of provincial powers also 
provides an indication as to how the _Q_§Jg.n..c.e of power between provincial and national 
government is shifting. Provincial powers as provided for in the final Constitution as well 
as the decision of the Constitutional Court with regard to the certification of the final 
Constitution are also dealt with. The issue. of pr:gyjrn:i'31 powers in practice and the 
question as to whether the prQyinces are functioning, or will, in the foreseeable future, 
be functioning, as "quasi-federal"7 power bases, will finally be addressed.8 
5 Note should be taken of the fact that space constraints do not allow for a full and comprehensive 
discussion and examination of, for example, established specialised commissions such as the 
Commission on Provincial Government (s 163) and the Financial and Fiscal Commission (s 198) 
(the so-called formal, specialized forums for facilitating and promoting inter-governmental 
relations), as well as those informal, voluntary forums which were established later, such as the 
MINMECs, the Premiers' Forum, the Intergovernmental Forum and the Technical Forum). For a 
discussion of the working of these forums see Botha "Formal and informal structures of 
intergovernmental relations" in Democratic Constitutional Development (1996) 93-98. See also 
De Villiers The Role and Powers of Provincial and Local Governments in the new Constitution 
(1996) 22-28. Note should be taken too that these forums had in any event mixed fortunes and/or 
success as regards the facilitation of intergovernmental co-operation. 
6 It is submitted that these concepts are critical to provincial government, but it is also submitted 
that they do not form a numerus clausus of concepts. (One is aware of other concepts such as 
openness, transparency, accountability, et cetera which are also crucial in this regard, but for the 
purposes of this dissertation will not be dealt with.) Nevertheless, substantiation for the inclusion 
of these concepts chosen, is to be found in the interim Constitution itself and in particular in the 
preamble and Schedule 4 (Constitutional Principles). The preamble refers, inter a/ia, to the 
creation of a sovereign and democratic constitutional state (my emphasis) whereas the 
Constitutional Principles deal with, inter alia, separation of powers and checks and balances in 
Principle VI, and with federalism (South African'style') in Principles XVI- XXVll. 
7 It should be noted that ·quasi-federal' is not used as a term of art, but merely in the more 
colloquial, popular sense of the word denoting a system that is neither full-blown federalist nor full-
blown unitary but merely a system that to a large degree contains "shades of federalism" or 
certain "variations on the theme" (of federalism). Even an acknowledged authority such as Elazar 
is not adverse to the use of "quasi-federal" in the more colloquial sense. See Exploring Federalism 
248. 
8 Erasmus "Provincial government under the 1993 Constitution. What direction will it take?" 1994 
SAPL 407. The aim will be to establish which direction provincial government took and whether 
the provincial governments are in practice more or less functioning as "quasi-federal" power 
bases. 
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2 CORE CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTS CRITICAL TO PROVINCIAL 
GOVERNANCE 
(a) Democracy and constitutionalism 
Democracy is a very relative concept which is often used in a political or ideological 
con text. 9 It is not an easy concept to define because it has many faces. People abuse 
the concept by bending it to suit their own views and ideologies, rather than to measure 
~---~-·--·--·-« '"""'. ----~-- -- ·---~~-" 
their ideologies against some fixed criterion. 10 Whatever formulation one uses to define 
democracy, the bottom line appears to be that the people (the electorate) should have 
the final say in regard to ho~_Jbey are to be govE3m§.d. The fact that the interim 
Constitution introduced a supreme constitutional dispensation with a justiciable Bill of 
Rights resulted in lawyers having to deal with competing conceptions of democracy. The 
expression of majority opinion will have to be reconciled with the core values embodied 
in the Constitution. 11 A workable democratic model to provide for the full realisation of 
both these concepts still has to be developed. 
Constitutionalism, like democracy, is a somewhat vague term with a philosophical rather 
th an a practical connotation. The popular definition for constitutionalism is "limited 
governmenr or "government by law". 12 Constitutionalism obviously embodies any 
concept which works towards prevention of a concentration of powers in one person and 
which ensures the protection of rights and liberties. Separation of powers, checks and 
balances, and the whole concept of democracy, or democratic accountability, are thus 
9 Carpenter Introduction to South African Constitutional Law (1987} 12; Van Wyk et al (eds} Rights 
and Constitutionalism: The New South African Legal Order (1994} 1 et seq. 
10 Carpenter op cit 12. 
11 Van Wyk Rights and Constitutionalism 26. 
12 "When 'we the people' have formulated a constitutional choice, it binds the more limited authority 
of government however constituted", because the concept of separation of powers precludes one 
branch of government from claiming to represent the people - see Van Wyk Rights and 
Constitutionalism 2. 
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also incorporated in the notion of constitutionalism. Michelman13 points out that 
constitutionalism is founded on two premJ~e$ regarc:jirig political freedom. The first 
premise is ~hat people 9reJQ ~e 9c:>YE3rned by themselves collectively, and the second 
is that people are to be governeq ~ws and not by "men". At first it might appear as 
'" ~~-·~~--.,·-~· ,. 
if there is a mutually exclusive tension between these two premises as the notions of 
self-rule (first premise) and that of law-rule (second premise) might seem to be 
incompatible. However, as Michelman points out, the two premises amount to the same 
thing, namely the electorate's demand to determine for themselves the norms that are 
to govern their social life (self-rule) and the electorate's demand for protection against 
abuse by arbitrary power (law-rule). 14 It is important to note that the concept of 
federalism facilitates the attainment of both these constitutional ideals. 
The conclusion reached when appraising the concepts of democracy and 
constitutionalism will to a large extent be determined by the perspective with which you 
view them. According to Acheampong democracy is regarded as being "rooted in the 
principle of popular sovereignty by which the citizenry is deemed to be the ultimate 
source of all state authority" .15 Ojwang points out that constitutionalism can be regarded 
as a general notion of which the primary significance is good government in the sense 
of submission to restraint vis-a-vis established rights and justified public expectations. 16 
Given these general characteristics of the two concepts, the current realisation thereof 
in the new South Africa can to a certain degree be evaluated against the background 
of the interim Constitution. 
In an overview of the events since April 1994, and given that the interim Constitution 
provides for the realisation of both concepts, it would seem as if democracy and 
constitutionalism has yet to be established as vital pillars of the new constitutional 
13 Michelman "Law's Republic" 1988 (97) Yale LJ 1500. 
14 Michelman op cit 1501 . 
15 Acheampong "Human Rights, Democracy and Development Aid to Africa" 1992 (8) Lesotho LJ 
22. 
16 0 j wang "Constitutionalism - In classical terms and in African Nationhood" 1990 (6) Lesotho LJ 
74. 
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order. 11 De Villiers commented (in 1992) that "[t]he verbal commitment of various 
organizations to democracy, and the way in which the very same organizations and their 
leadership handle differences of opinion, both internally and externally could be 
questioned."18 His comments then could just as well have been directed at the current 
situation since not much has changed. 
(b) Separation of powers and checks and balances 
The exact meaning of the "separation of powersn doctrine is not immediately obvious 
as the doctrine is not applied in exactly the same way in any two countries. 19 The 
essence of the doctrine is, however, the same, namely that power should be 
am eJi.orated, and thqL~becks and b§.@Dces should be inJ.Qosed to av.aid cancentratiqQ__ 
ol~wer in one _p_erson or groyp_Qf_p_er:s.ons, thus limiting the possibility of an_arbltr:ary 
exercise of pqwer. It should be borne in mind that nowhere in the world is a complete 
separation of powers to be found. Partial overlapping of the various governmental 
functions not only promotes the effective operation of checks and balances but also 
contributes to effective government. 20 In the governmental arrangement which we now 
have, it should be noted that separation of powers not only operates in the traditional 
horizontal context, but also in a vertical context as between the national and provincial 
~ governments. 21 
r 
• 
,/ 
' 
The interim Constitution makes adequate provision for the practical implementation of 
separation of powers and checks and balances. 22 However, an overview of events of 
the past two and a half years reveals that these concepts have not yet been fully 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
The Star 1996-10-23 24; Sunday Times 1996-09-15 1. 
De Villiers "Pitfalls for Negotiations and Democracyn 1992 HSRC Publications 4 as quoted in Licht 
and De Villiers (eds) South Africa's Crisis of Constitutional Democracy. Can the US Constitution 
Help? (1994) 32 . 
Carpenter op cit 158; see Van Wyk Rights and Constitutionalism 71 n 389. 
Carpenter op cit 157. 
Ojo "Separation of Powers in a Presidential System of Govemmenr 1981 Public Law 106. 
Du Plessis & Corder op cit 21. 
( 
) 
l 
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realised. 23 In spite of political rhetoric to the contrary it does not seem as if the concept 
of separation of powers and checks and balances is animated. The problem seems to 
be a lack of understanding of the concept itself as well as the vital importance thereof 
to the whole democratic order.24 Another factor which compounds the non-realisation 
of this concept is the fact that in many of the provinces the opposition parties are so 
poorly represented in the provincial legislature that they cannot even muster enough 
votes to bring into play certain vital counterbalancing procedures which are provided for 
in the rules and orders of the provincial legislatures. 
(c) Federalism 
Whereas the necessity for the realisation of the preceding constitutional concepts is 
self-explanatory, that is not the case with federalism. 25 There is an ongoing pro-
federalism/anti-federalism debate which is mainly contested along party-political lines. 
There are various reasons why federalism (whatever its precise nature) is regarded as 
a constitutional 'must' for South Africa. 26 Amongst these reasons advanced, are that 
federalism is about the "prevention and control of centralised 'majority' power".21 Cilliers, 
for example, points out that the tragic history of apartheid has shown that centralised 
23 Sunday Times 1996-04-28 4; Financial Mail 1996-08-30 19. 
24 The Star 1996-10-23 24. Incidents like the Shell House and Sarafina debacles as well as the 
recent firing of Premier Lekota (to name only a few) all point to the concept of separation of 
powers not yet being "functional". At national level President Mandela has of late been involved 
in several acts of interference whereby the executive will of government was forced onto 
Parliament. Those incidents would seem to point to a lack of understanding of the importance of 
the separation of powers to the vitality of democracy. At provincial level it is clear to anybody who 
has been closely involved with the provinces that the provincial executive is viewed as the face 
of provincial government and that the provincial legislature is perceived to be subservient to the 
provincial executive and actually acts accordingly. 
25 As stated in fn 4 no comprehensive discussion of the typical characteristics of the concept of 
federalism is undertaken except for the indication of a few features as evidenced from the 
provisions in both the interim and final Constitutions. 
26 That federalism (in whatever form ) was to be regarded as of crucial importance was already in 
evidence right from the start of the negotiations as seen from the arguments by the various role-
players in this respect (see fn 1 ). The interim Constitution, after all, also makes provision for 
federalism in one or other form (see fn 3). 
27 Van Wyk "Looking at the new South Africa: thoughts about federation and federalism" 1991 SAPL 
99. 
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power should indeed be prevented and controlled through federalism because the 
"inescapable reality of South African society is that it is heterogenous and 
cosmopolit~C?fA~other reason is advanced by Elazar who writes (with reference to third 
World countries) that "federalism has proved useful in accommodating diversity".29 Any 
e I ement of federalism in the new constitutional dispensation could therefore serve to 
ameliorate the concentration of power in the hands of the national government. In the 
light of the underlying tensions that are prevalent in our country that seems to be the 
route to follow. 
Even though it might seem as if we need a certain amount of federalism in our 
constitutional dispensation the issues of "how" and "how much" still remain extremely 
problematic. Federalism as a form of state can take various forms and can be 
a p preached from various angles. There is no single definition of what a federal state 
should be and there is no ideal or perfect federal (or unitary) state.30 Many federal 
states have strong unitary characteristics, 31 while numerous unitary states exhibit 
definite federalistic tendencies. 32 As De Villiers has pointed out it should also be borne 
in mind that the best known federations did not originate as much a result of a clear 
philosophical (constitutional) plan, but were rather the outcome of pragmatic 
considerations and historical forces at the particular time.33 It should also be noted that 
the Constitution of a particular country obviously does not necessarily offer an accurate 
picture of the actual state of provincial autonomy. 
28 Cilliers op cit 482. 
29 Elazar Exploring Federalism 248. See also De Villiers The Federal/Unitary Debate who refers 
to South Africa's geographical and population size, as well as the ethnic diversity and the need 
to bring government closer to the people as inevitably necessitating the application of certain 
aspects of federalism (11 ). See too Erasmus "The new Constitutional dispensation: What type of 
system?" 1994 Politikon 9 who refers to federalism as a mechanism suitable for cooperation in 
a society with diverse local needs and that its territorial separation of powers protects local and 
individual rights . 
30 De Villiers The Federal/Unitary Debate 8. 
31 For example India, Austria and Germany. 
32 For example Spain, the United Kingdom and Italy. 
33 De Villiers The Federal/Unitary Debate 8. 
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Irrespective of the variations in form and application it seems as if federations normally 
sh are the following fundamental characteristics that separate them from unitary 
systems:34 
Supremacy of the constitution which means that any laws which purport to upset 
the balance of powers of the various levels of government and which are in 
conflict with the constitution, will be null and void; 
Shared rule between national and provincial governments which means that a 
partnership is established between the various levels of government to ensure 
that the functions pertaining to the different levels are performed in a co-
ordinated fashion; 
Self rule by provincial governments which means that the powers and functions 
of provincial governments are guaranteed by a supreme constitution; 
Protection of provincial institutional and territorial integrity which means that the 
constitutional and territorial autonomy of provincial governments as entrenched 
in a supreme constitution, is guaranteed; and 
An allocation of revenue resources between the national and provincial levels of 
government, including some areas of autonomy for each level. 35 
When the interim Constitution is assessed with reference to these fundamental 
characteristics it appears to be of a composite or hybrid nature in that it contains 
elements which are federal in nature, as well as elements which are more likely to be 
found in a unitary system. Some of the characteristics of the interim Constitution which 
favour federalism are the fact that there. is a supreme Constitution which makes 
provision for three levels of government; provincial representation in the national 
34 De Villiers The Federal/Unitary Debate 12. 
35 Watts "Is the new Constitution Federal or Unitary?" in De Villiers {ed) Birth of a Constitution (1994) 
77. 
\. 
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legislative process; provisions for provincial constitutions; the protection of the integrity 
of provincial governments and the provision for an independent arbiter in the form of the 
Constitutional Court. 36 Certain characteristics that are more akin to a unitary system are: 
the subordinate intergovernmental financial arrangements, the sharing of certain 
officers, commissions and services and the provision of overriding national legislation. 
In the light of the above it seems as if there is general agreement that the interim 
Constitution provides for some sort of a "quasi-federal" arrangement,37 which can, as 
Watts has done, probably be classified most accurately as a hybrid system. 38 It should, 
however, be borne in mind that, as De Villiers, Watts and Erasmus all have pointed out 
at one stage or another, the technical dimension of federalism is subordinate to that 
which is agreed upon at the political level. 39 
A very important issue, which is constantly being overlooked, was raised by Van Wyk 
five years ago when he pointed out that as a "human rights culture" will have to be 
developed, so will a "federal culture" have to be fostered in the new South Africa.40 
3 PROVINCIAL POWERS UNDER THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION 
The practical application of the provisions of the interim Constitution that pertain to 
provincial administration should be seen against the background that the provinces did 
from the outset not possess the necessary infrastructure and expertise to deal with a 
36 Elazar "Form of State: Federal, Unitary or .. ." in De Villiers (ed) Birth of a Constitution (1994) 31 
et seq. 
37 Elazar Form of State 36; Watts op cit 88, Beukes "Governing the regions: or regional (and local) 
government in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993" 1994 
SAPL 399-400; Cilliers op cit 480 is, however, of the opinion that the interim Constitution merely 
contains federal elements. 
38 Watts op cit 86. 
39 Watts op cit 77; Erasmus The new Constitutional Dispensation 17. De Villiers Powers 5 referred 
to constitutional, political and practical benchmarks that impact on provincial powers. 
40 Van Wyk Federalism 101; Wamala "Federalism in Africa: Lessons for South Africa• in De Villiers 
(ed) Evaluating Federal Systems 265 
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revolutionary new constitutional arrangement. 41 It was therefore extremely difficult for 
the provinces to facilitate full realisation of the relevant provisions of the interim 
Constitution. 
(a) Constitutional Principles 
The Constitutional Principles are a set of thirty-four provisions contained in Schedule 
4 to the interim Constitution. These are principles which were agreed upon and adopted 
by the Negotiating Council of the multi-party negotiating process to provide guidelines 
for the drafting of the final Constitution. 42 In the preamble of the interim Constitution, the 
Constitutional Principles are described as a solemn pact in accordance with which the 
elected representatives of all the people of South Africa should be mandated to adopt 
a new Constitution. 43 The new constitutional text has to comply with the Constitutional 
Principles and that text, even if it is passed by the Constitutional Assembly, shall not be 
of any force and effect unless the Constitutional Court has certified that all the 
provisions of such text comply with the Constitutional Principles. 44 
The importance of the question of provincial powers is reflected in the fact that the 
majority of the Constitutional Principles pertain to that issue. Provincial powers were 
also the major consideration in the Constitutional Court's evaluation of the final 
Constitution for purposes of certification. 45 The Constitutional Principles, when viewed 
as a solemn pact, gave rise in some quarters to expectations of a more substantial 
federal arrangement for the provinces in the final Constitution. 46 
41 The reasons why the interim Constitution does not make provision for the establishment of 
administrative capacity before the devolution of power onto the provinces is dealt with in para 5 
infra. 
42 Van Wyk Rights and Constitutionalism 159. 
43 Du Plessis & Corder op cit 13. 
44 Section 71 of the interim Constitution. 
45 See fn 73. 
46 See fn 76. 
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(b) Sections 36 and 48 - establishment and composition of Senate 
Sections 36 and 48 of the interim Constitution provide for a Senate, the composition of 
which is designed to represent the provinces in Parliament. As the issue of provincial 
representation in the National Assembly is dealt with more fully elsewhere41 suffice it to 
say that the one issue which most observers seem to agree upon is that the Senate 
failed dismally in its designed function of representing provincial interests in 
Parliament.48 
(c) Sections 61 and 62 - power of provinces to resist certain Bills amending 
Constitution 
Sections 61 and 62 of the interim Constitution are aimed at preserving provincial 
autonomy by providing for certain procedural safeguards which come into operation 
when provincial boundaries or powers are to be affected by amending legislation. 
In Premier of KwaZulu/Natal v President of the Republic of South Africa49 the 
Constitutional Court had the opportunity to consider the scope of section 62(2) of the 
interim Constitution. 00 In this case the Premier of KwaZulu/Natal sought an order 
declaring unconstitutional various amendments to the interim Constitution which 
removed or altered powers granted to the provincial legislature and executive. 
4 7 See para 5 infra. 
48 De Villiers Powers 15. See also the series of articles alluding to this failure in Business Day 1995-
04-12 8; Financial Mail 1996-05-03 43, Financial Mail 1996-03-22 46. See too the ANC's Building 
a United Nation -ANC policy proposal for the final Constitution 14. 
49 1995 (12) BCLR 1561 (CC). Neither the purpose of this dissertation nor space constraints permit 
a more comprehensive, critical and penetrating analysis of the various Constitutional Court 
decisions referred to in this dissertation. Each of these decisions warrants a separate in-depth 
critical analysis. In this dissertation these decisions are only referred to by way of illustrating a 
particular point. 
50 Section 62(2) of the interim Constitution provides as follows: "No amendments of sections 126 
and 144 shall be of any force and effect unless passed separately by both Houses by a majority 
of at least two-thirds of all the members in each House: Provided that the boundaries and 
legislative and executive competences of a province shall not be amended without the consent 
of a relevant provincial legislature: 
12 
The Court held that for the proviso to section 62(2) to find application the relevant 
am ending legislation sought to be passed must not be of equal application to all 
provinces, but should only be targeted at one or more of the provinces. In view of the 
fact that there is no textual justification for such an interpretation, the mere fact that the 
proviso is phrased in the singular can surely not be decisive. This interpretation of the 
Court could therefore create an avenue for abuse of power by the national 
government.51 For example, the national government could alter the legislative 
competency of a province radically by merely passing general legislation whereby the 
legislative competencies of all the provinces are uniformly affected. The competencies 
of the provinces which were not the "targer of the central government could merely be 
restored at a later stage. 
(d) Section 126 - legislative competences of provinces 
Section 126 provides for qualified provincial legislative power. A province may legislate 
with regard to all matters which fall within the functional areas specified in Schedule 6. 
Section 126(3) does, however, contain five widely-formulated exceptions which provide 
for overriding national powers should the national government legislate on the provincial 
competencies contained in Schedule 6. The provincial legislative powers in Schedule 
6 are subject to overriding national legislation in the following circumstances:52 
where a matter cannot be dealt with effectively at provincial level; 
where national uniform norms and standards are required for the rendering of 
public services; 
where national minimum standards are required for the rendering of public 
services; 
where the maintenance of economic unity, environmental protection, the 
promotion and protection of various aspects of interprovincial relations, and 
national security require parliamentary regulation; and 
51 Gotz 1996SAJHR169. 
52 Van Wyk Rights and Constitutionalism 166. 
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where a provincial law has a materially negative effect on the economic, health, 
or security interests of another province or the country as a whole, or if it impedes 
the implementation of national economic policies. 
The criteria in section 126(3)(a)-(e) will have to be interpreted and applied by the 
Constitutional Court in the event of a dispute between a province and the national 
government. 
The provinces have not made use of their substantive legislative powers in terms of 
section 126. The essential Acts53 were passed by the various provincial legislatures but 
these related to such basic infra structural issues that they can be discarded for the 
purpose of evaluating the effect of section 126. It would have been of great value if 
provincial legislative powers in the final Constitution could have been moulded on 
practical feedback on section 126 of the interim Constitution. 54 
The reality that the provincial legislative powers in section 126 are subject to a national 
override in certain generally construed instances came to the fore in In Re: The National 
Education Bill No 83 of 1995.55 In this case the constitutionality of certain provisions of 
the National Education Policy Bill had to be decided on. The main argument of the 
political parties who brought the challenge was that the Bill encroached upon the 
legislative authority of the provinces and their executive authority. The Constitutional 
Court held that the powers of Parliament and by implication those of the provincial 
legislatures, depended ultimately upon the language of the interim Constitution 
constructed in the light of our own history. The Court further held that the provinces in 
South Africa are not sovereign states since they were created by the interim 
Constitution and have only those powers which are specifically conferred on them in 
terms of the interim Constitution. Their legislative powers are confined to Schedule 6 
matters and even those powers are only concurrent with the powers of Parliament. 
53 The reference is to legislation such as the provincial Exchequer Acts, provincial Public Protector 
Acts, and Powers and Privileges of Provincial Legislature Acts. 
54 Finance Week 9-15 February 1995 5. 
55 1996 (4) BCLR 518 (CC). 
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(e) Section 144 - executive authority of provinces 
In terms of section 144 of the interim Constitution the provinces derive their executive 
authority from three sources: exercised provincial legislative competences; powers 
delegated by any law; and powers assigned to the province under section 235(8) or any 
law. 56 In some of the provinces the perception exists that a province has executive 
power over all the legislative competences contained in Schedule 6. This is, however, 
not the case as a proper interpretation of section 144(2) reveals that executive power 
with regard to a specific legislative competence will only vest in a province once they 
have actually legislated over that given competence.57 
A question that arose when it became evident that the assignment of powers under 
section 235(8) could not be done overnight, was whether the provinces could not have 
vested executive authority with regard to a specific provincial competence by merely 
adopting a provincial bill which is a verbatim "replica" of the relevant Act(s) that is to be 
assigned to the province under section 235(8) (and which obviously pertains to that 
specific provincial competence). Such an argument would however seem to encroach 
upon the functional ambit of section 235(8), and would also be against the spirit of the 
interim Constitution. 
(f) Sections 155 to 158 - provincial finance and fiscal affairs 
Sections 155 to 158 provide for a share of the national revenue to be allocated to the 
provinces as well as for a limited provincial tax base. The provinces may also raise 
loans for capital expenditure. It is a fair assessment that the intergovernmental financial 
arrangements contained in these sections appear to reinforce the subordination of the 
provinces since the allocation of funds are left to the determination by Parliament.58 The 
one element qualifying the dominance of the National Government in this regard is the 
56 Chaskalson op cit 4. 
57 See Chaskalson op cit 44 for a well-substantiated argument why the executive authority does not 
vest in a province by virtue of the mere existence of abstract legislative competence. 
58 Watts op cit 82. 
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requirement that Parliament takes into account the recommendations of the Financial 
and Fiscal Commission. 59 The recommendations of the Commission are in any event 
not binding upon Parliament. It is also a well accepted fact that the Commission did not 
develop to its full potential under the interim Constitution and that the "protection" 
afforded to the provinces in that regard has subsequently not really materialised . 60 
It should be noted that equitable fiscal and financial allocations in the final Constitution 
are "mandated" by Constitutional Principle XXVll. The financial bases of the provinces 
as provided for in these sections - which sections were subjected to late amendments 
so as to strengthen the position of the provinces somewhat - are one of the basic 
prerequisites for any kind of substantial autonomy by the provinces. 
(g) Section 160 - adoption of provincial constitutions 
The interim Constitution provides that each provincial legislature shall be entitled to pass 
its own provincial constitution by a resolution of a majority of at least two thirds of all its 
members. Subsection (3) of section 160, which was also one of the late amendments 
to the interim Constitution, provides that a provincial constitution may provide for 
legislative and executive structures different from those which are provided for in the 
interim Constitution. 
In any "quasi-federalistic" arrangement (whatever the precise nature) one would have 
expected a section pertaining to provincial constitutions to find application as soon as 
possible. It would, after all, have provided a very marketable concretisation of provincial 
autonomy. In the euphoria of the "new" South Africa it therefore came as no surprise 
that most provinces were keen to adopt a provincial constitution so as to prove that they 
were not merely "beefed up" self-governing territories or provincial administrations of the 
national Government. At one stage (end of 1994) the idea was to entrench the existing 
provincial powers via a provincial constitution as rumour had it that the provincial powers 
59 Section 199 of the interim Constitution. 
60 De Villiers Powers 13. 
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in the final Constitution would be substantially diminished in a" trade-off' for more 
effective protection of provincial interests via a revamped Senate. Party politics and the 
introduction of the concept of co-operative governance did however see to it that most 
of the provinces decided against the adoption of a provincial constitution. 61 
KwaZulu/Natal was the only province to adopt a provincial constitution which was 
submitted to the Constitutional Court for certification.62 In the KwaZulu/Natal certification 
case,63 the Court deemed the reference to "legislative structures and procedures" in 
section 160(3) to be a clear reference to structures and procedures which may be 
necessary or appropriate for the proper functioning of the provincial organs of 
government.64 The Court emphasized that "structures and procedures" do not relate to 
the fundamental nature and substance of the democratic state created by the interim 
Constitution nor to the substance of the legislative or executive powers of the (national) 
Parliament or Government or those of the provinces. 65 
The Constitutional Court made it quite clear that a province cannot determine its own 
status within the Republic: a province has no authority to confer any legislative or 
executive authority on itself as such power emanates exclusively from the interim 
Constitution.66 The Court found that several of the provisions of the provincial 
constitution purported to usurp national powers. 67 It would appear from the decision that 
the Constitutional Court will not "tolerate" any full-blown federal or secessionist 
tendencies in provincial constitutions. This appears from its description of the 
61 By mid-1995 it appeared that no provincial constitutions would be forthcoming from the ANC 
provinces. 
62 The Western Cape province apparently also drafted a provincial constitution but the matter was 
not pursued pending certification of the final (national) Constitution. 
63 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, 1996 CCT 15/96 (as yet 
unreported). 
64 Para 4 of the judgment. 
65 Para 5 of the judgment. 
66 Para 8 of the judgment. 
67 Para 14 of the judgment. 
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KwaZulu/Natal provincial constitution as having "flagrantly and obviously exceeded the 
bounds of provincial legislative competence". 68 
The significance of the fact that nearly all of the provinces refrained from adopting their 
own provincial constitutions should not be overlooked. Leonardy regards the provision 
for provincial constitutions in the interim Constitution as a very important indicator of a 
shift from devolution towards federalism and the insertion of section 160(3) as a true 
federal expression of self-determination and autonomy. 69 The non-realisation of section 
160(3) therefore reflects negatively on the possibility of truly autonomous provincial 
governments. 
(h) Section 235(8) - assignment of administration of laws 
Section 235(8) of the interim Constitution provides for the assignment of the 
administration of laws to a province if such province has the administrative capacity to 
exercise and perform the powers and functions in question. The application of section 
235(8) of the interim Constitution was therefore the first opportunity to observe the inter-
governmental balance in the new South Africa. In the beginning the premiers were 
(perhaps unintentionally) very supportive of certain principles which in essence were 
extremely federal in nature. The provincial message to the national government was 
quite clear: give us as much power possible in as short a time as possible. 
The administrative capacity prerequisite contained in section 235(8) was disregarded 
and the provinces insisted that all the laws pertaining to Schedule 6 competences be 
assigned to them immediately. After this was eventually done, it transpired that in many 
instances neither the administrative capacity nor the provincial resolve existed to 
actually administer them and the administration of many laws come to nought. 70 
68 Para 38 of the judgment. 
69 Leonardy "Constitutional Provisions on Devolution and Federalism" in De Villiers (ed) Birth of a 
Constitution (1994) 167. 
70 Finance Week 9-15 February 1995 5; The provincial officials who became responsible for the 
ad ministration of laws that were assigned to the provinces did not even bother to obtain copies 
of such laws, let alone to become acquainted with the legal contents thereof. 
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Section 235(8) was in issue before the Constitutional Court in Executive Council, 
Western Cape Legislature v President of the Republic of South Africa. 71 The dispute 
concerned the validity of certain amendments to the Local Government Transition Act 
209 of 1993, effected by proclamation by the President purporting to act in terms of 
powers conferred on him by that Act. The Court was divided as to whether the Local 
Government Act in fact fell within the scope of the President's powers under section 
235(8). In interpreting section 235(8) the Court followed a holistic approach by referring 
to all the other transitional provisions as well. For our purposes, it would suffice to say 
th at the approach of the majority of the judges towards the functional ambit of section 
235(8) can be regarded (by necessary implication) as being supportive of strong central 
government competence.72 
Nevertheless the relevance of this case with regard to the issue of provincial powers 
flows from the result of the case and not so much from any particular dicta by the Court. 
The Constitutional Court not only showed its willingness to decide in favour of a 
province, but also one that is controlled by a minority party in the national government. 
However, it would be misleading to characterise this decision as a victory for federalism. 
The extent to which the Constitutional Court focussed on section 235(8) is indicative of 
the importance of the section as a means by which the distribution of powers between 
the national and provincial levels of government is to be effected. Section 235(8) was 
also intended to act as a control mechanism in that the assignment of the administration 
of laws to a province is subject to the proviso that such province has the necessary 
administrative capacity to exercise and perform the powers and functions in question. 
In this latter respect section 235(8) failed as it should be fairly obvious to any observer 
that most, if not all, of the provinces are struggling to cope with the administrative 
demands of some of the assigned legislation. 
71 1995 (10) BCLR 1289 (CC). 
72 Klaaren 1996 SAJHR 162. 
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4 PROVINCIAL POWERS UNDER THE FINAL CONSTITUTION 
Although the final Constitution was not certified first time round, 73 the necessary 
implication of the Constitutional Court's judgment seems to be that no substantial 
amendments will have to be effected thereto in order for the final Constitution to comply 
with the Constitutional Principles. I therefore do not foresee that the Constitutional Court 
will refuse to certify the final Constitutional text on account of the reformulated provincial 
powers, 74 despite the objections from certain political parties. In the light of the above 
a very brief overview will be given of certain of the provisions of the final Constitution 
relating to provincial powers. 75 
(a) Impact of the Constitutional Principles 
A point of view existed that the Constitutional Principles provide for a distinctly more 
federal provincial arrangement or at the very least an arrangement which is substantially 
more federal than that the interim Constitution provided for. 76 These expectations did 
not materialise and although the final Constitution was not certified it was made very 
clear by the Constitutional Court that the required "touch-up work" that had to be done 
to the final Constitution "should present no significant obstacle to the formulation of a 
text which complies fully with these requirements".77 It would therefore seem as if the 
said expectations are also not realised in the reformulated text of the final Constitution. 
Although the majority of Constitutional Principles are focused on provincial powers the 
Constitutional Court did not question the apparent disparity between the pronounced 
73 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 ( 1 0) BCLR 1253 
(CC). Hereinafter "the Certification judgment". 
7 4 In any event, the provisions pertaining to provincial governance contained in the final Constitution 
as amended on 11 October 1996 does not differ substantially from that originally submitted to the 
Constitutional Court. 
75 The formalistic confines of this dissertation do not permit an elaborate discussion of the relevant 
provisions of the final Constitution. 
76 Welsh "Drafting the final Constitution" 1994 Indicator South Africa Quarterly Report (12) 19. 
77 Para 483 of the Certification judgment. 
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commitment to more "autonomy" to the provinces in the Principles and the 
Constitutional Assembly's "interpretation" of these Principles in drafting Chapter 7 of the 
final Constitution. 
(b) Sections 42 and 60 - establishment and composition of National Council of 
the Provinces 
The National Council of Provinces (NCoP) is to replace the Senate as the forum through 
which provincial interests are to be represented at national level.78 The Constitutional 
Court found that although it is not possible to say whether the collective interest of the 
provinces will necessarily be enhanced by the NCoP, 79 it seems that the structure and 
functioning of the NCoP differs from that of the Senate to such an extent as to render 
it better suited than the Senate to represent provincial interests.80 It would therefore 
appear that a "trade-off' of provincial legislature competences for better representation 
at national level could have occurred. 
(c) Section 74 - power of provinces to resist certain Bills amending 
Constitution 
Section 7 4(3) of the final Constitution provides for a provincial veto where a Bill before 
Parliament that affects the NCoP, alters the provincial boundaries or amends a provision 
that deals specifically with a provincial matter concerns only a specific province or 
provinces. Such a Bill cannot be made law unless it is approved by at least six provinces 
in the Council. Although the general purport of section 7 4(3) of the final Constitution and 
section 61 of the interim Constitution are similar the veto provided for in section 7 4(3) 
of the final Constitution, only pertains to Bills which amend the Constitution, and not to 
ordinary legislation which may also negatively affect the provinces. In this regard there 
is a diminution of the powers of individual provinces to resist national intervention. 
78 The composition of the National Council of Provinces is discussed in para 5 infra. 
79 Para 331 of the Certification judgment. 
80 Ibid. 
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(d) Section 104 - legislative authority of provinces 
The legislative authority of the provinces is provided for in section 104 of the final 
Constitution. The final Constitution, unlike the interim Constitution, does in fact contain 
a reference to exclusive provincial powers.81 Prima facie it would immediately therefore 
appear as if the "trade-off' theory was only a lot of hot air. 82 In my opinion, the exclusive 
label is merely decorative. The legislative competences contained in Schedule 5 (FC) 
are no more exclusive than the provincial legislative competences in Schedule 6 (IC) 
as their ostensible exclusive nature is in effect nullified by several sections of the final 
Constitution. 83 
(e) Section 125 - executive authority of provinces 
As far as executive powers are concerned section 125 (FC) differs from section 144(1C). 
Section 125(3) (FC) provides that provinces will only enjoy executive authority in 
developing and implementing provincial policy to the extent that the province has the 
administrative capacity to assume effective responsibility. Section 125(3) (FC) also 
imposes an obligation on national government to assist the provinces to develop the 
necessary administrative capacity. The effect of section 100 (FC) is that the 
implementation of provincial legislation in a province is not an exclusive provincial 
competence anymore as it grants intervenary powers to the national executive over 
provincial affairs where a province cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation in 
terms of legislation or the Constitution. 
The Constitutional Court found that sections 100 and 125(3) (FC) do not encroach upon 
the legitimate autonomy of the provinces and subsequently held that no diminution of 
provincial powers in this regard has taken place.84 
81 Schedule 5 of the final Constitution. 
82 See para 3 supra. 
83 Inter alia refer to sections 44(2), 146(4)(a), 147(1)(b), 147(2) and 228(2) of the final Constitution. 
For ease of reference "IC" refers to "interim Constitution" and "FC" to "final Constitution". 
84 Paras 266 and 267 of the Certification judgment. 
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(f) Sections 142 and 143 - contents of provincial constitutions 
Section 143 (FC) provides that a provincial constitution may not be inconsistent with the 
fin al Constitution save for two areas in which the provisions of a provincial constitution 
can be different from the corresponding provisions in the final Constitution.85 Section 
143(2) (FC) provides for areas in respect of which the constitution-making powers of the 
provinces are limited. The areas of limitation are essentially that a provincial constitution 
must comply with Chapter 3 of the final Constitution86 and the values in section 1, and 
that a provincial constitution may not confer upon a province powers or functions 
beyond those conferred on it by the final Constitution. Although the areas of limitation 
in section 143 of the final Constitution seem to be more extensive than those contained 
in section 160 of the interim Constitution, the Constitutional Court found that the 
provisions do not differ substantially. The Court concluded that section 160 of the 
interim Constitution and sections 142 and 143 of the final Constitution all make provision 
for a constitution-making power which is subject to the same limitations. 
(g) Section 214 - equitable share and allocation of revenue 
Section 214 of the final Constitution makes provision for a different manner in which the 
province's equitable share of the national income is to be determined. Under section 
155(2) of the interim Constitution the equitable share of the provinces was made up of 
various sources of revenue. 87 Section 214 of the final Constitution does however not 
specify the sources of funding but establishes a process for determining an equitable 
share for each province. The specific categories or sources of revenue under the interim 
Constitution have been done away with. Section 214(2), however, introduces a host of 
additional substantive and procedural safeguards to determine the actual amount of the 
equitable share. 
85 Section 143(1) of the final Constitution. The areas are provincial legislation and executive 
structures and procedures and the issue of the traditional monarchy. 
86 Chapter 3 of the final Constitution deals with co-operative government. 
87 Income tax, value-added tax, fuel levies, transfer duty and additional allocations by national 
government. 
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(h) "The weighing of the baskets"88 
After comparing the provincial powers provided for in the interim Constitution with those 
provided for in the final Constitution, the Constitutional Court found that provincial 
powers in terms of the final Constitution are less than and inferior to the powers and 
functions which the provinces enjoy under the interim Constitution.89 
The question which the Court then had to address was whether it could be said that the 
provincial powers as provided for in the final Constitution were substantially less than 
or substantially inferior to those provided for under the interim Constitution. After 
consideration of this issue the Court found that with regard to provincial representation 
in the National Assembly, financial powers of the provinces and in respect of the nature 
of the provision for provincial constitutions, no material changes were effected in the 
final Constitution. 90 
There is however a presumption in the final Constitution which favours national 
legislation which is sought to be justified on the grounds that it is necessary for one of 
the overriding purposes provided in section 146(2)(c).91 There is also an alteration in the 
scope of the provision for national overriding powers. The criterion for the setting of 
norms and standards has been changed from the "effective performance of a matter"92 
to "in the interests of the country as a whole."93 The Constitutional Court found that 
these changes strengthen national legislation and weaken the position of the provinces 
88 Para 443 of the Certification judgment 
89 Para 4 71 of the Certification judgment. 
90 Para 4 7 4 of the Certification judgment. 
91 Section 146(4) of the final Constitution. 
92 Section 126(3)(b) of the interim Constitution. 
93 Section 146(2)(b) of the final Constitution. 
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and, along with the curtailment of provincial powers,94 are sufficient to be considered a 
substantial diminishment of provincial powers.95 
5 PROVINCIAL POWERS IN PRACTICE: "THE CENTRE CANNOT 
HOLD"96 
With regard to the evaluation of provincial powers I fully agree with De Villiers97 that an 
over-emphasis has thus far been placed on the legal and technical aspects of provincial 
powers while other important determinants have been overlooked.98 De Villiers identified 
eight factors that are crucially influential on the powers and functions of the provinces 
vis-a-vis the national government.99 
De Villiers provides a very sound basis and departure point for any evaluation of 
provincial powers. 100 As regards the actual implementation of the interim Constitution 
it appeared from the outset that provincial governance in practice did not by any stretch 
- ~-~~·-~--"<•'"'h""'"'''~·~ ..... 
QfJ.be imagination live up to the pre-election expectations. The reasons therefore are 
numerous and of a widely diverging nature. One of the main reasons is the fact that the 
sequence of the processes by which the provinces were empowered appears to have 
been completely wrong. Properly established provincial administrations should have 
preceded the bestowal of powers on the provinces and not the other way round as the 
94 See para 471 of the Certification judgment. 
95 Para 481 of the Certification judgment. 
96 In the Mail & Guardian 22-28 November 1996 a very informative perspective into the realities of 
provincial governance appeared under the heading "The centre cannot hold". 
97 De Villiers Powers 5. 
98 Financial constraints, party political influence, the role of the second (provincial) chamber, 
importance of intergovernmental relations and the impact of civil society on a multi-tiered system. 
99 De Villiers Powers 5. The factors are: distribution of powers; distribution of finances, composition 
and powers of the second house of national parliament; organization of the public service; nature 
of intergovernmental relations; role of party political organization and structure; role of civil society 
and the role of local government. 
100 De Villiers Powers 5. 
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interim Constitution in fact provided for. It also appears as if the priorities of the 
provinces were misdirected from the outset as they paid too much attention to national 
politics in stead of focusing on the establishment of fully fledged provincial power 
bases.101 The other reasons for the slow development of provincial powers are too 
numerous to deal with individually.102 
Added to the problems referred to above are developments that are more of a political 
than a constitutional nature. These will obviously not be discussed here but cognizance 
should be taken thereof as they are of such a substantial and serious nature as to have 
reportedly driven a senator of the provincial house in Parliament to have called for divine 
intervention with regard to the provincial problem! 103 
The significance of this problematic state of provincial affairs is that it makes a mockery 
of the constitutional endeavours that went into drafting the "provincial" provisions of the 
interim Constitution. It is now clearer why several sections of the interim Constitution 
including sections 124, 104 126, 160 and 235(8) did not come to be fully realiseC:f~ This 
is where, in my opinion, the same mistakes as those made with the introduction of the 
101 Meyer "Regional and Local Government takes shape" 1994 (August) RSA Review 1; Lategan 
"Effective provincial government ensures a winning nation" 1995 (July) RSA Review 33; Business 
Day 1995-04-12 8 ; Finance Week 4-10 August 1994 12. 
102 To name a few: personal and political power aspirations, appointment of inexperienced 
opportunists in key provincial positions, perceived lack of legitimacy of the interim Constitution 
itself; lack of resolve to develop into fully-fledged provincial government. 
103 "Oh God help us - the provinces! I wish we had never invented them" - Mail & Guardian 22-28 
November 1996 13. The developments referred to which also compound the provincial 
governance problem are the following: the inefficiency of provincial government; the difficulties 
experienced in the management of the provinces, the rise of the provincial power bases as 
political "launching pads" for political dissidents and ambitious premiers; the amount of power 
concentrated at provincial level; the lack of accountability and the lack of information on provincial 
developments. 
104 Although the issue of affected areas is adequately provided for in section 124 of the interim 
Constitution the governments of Mpumalanga and the Northern Province persisted in their 
unconstitutional and undemocratic endeavours to deal with the Groblersdal, Marble Hall and 
Bosbokrand issues on a political level. It was only after much public attention had been drawn to 
the issue and after intervention by the national government that the issue was dealt with as 
provided for in the Constitution - The Star 1995-10-02 35; The Sowetan 1995-10-0416; Business 
Day 1996-03-05 7. 
105 Finansies & Tegniek 1994-08-26 28 
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interim Constitution are repeated with the introduction of the final Constitution. We are 
again putting the cart before the horse. Without evaluating the success (and failures) 
of the provincial governments under the interim Constitution we are (again) plunging into 
some form of quasi-provincial autonomy while retaining the inherent weakness of the 
old system. 106 
Although reference has been made to a number of problems facing provincial 
governance it is not possible to deal with them individually. The issue of provincial 
representation in the National Assembly is, however, of such cardinal importance to the 
provincial cause that it warrants elaboration. In that regard the following excerpt seems 
most telling: 
The exact role and need for a Senate needs consideration. It does not currently have a 
sufficiently identifiable purpose or powers to warrant its special status. In its current form it 
is a mirror image of the Assembly. It does not appear to be regarded by the provinces as 
their 'house'. Without a specific regional function the Senate constitutes an institution with 
little to offer. 107 
In addition to being a mere mirror image of the National Assembly the link that the 
Senate has with the provinces is also weak. The senators act and vote under the 
discipline of their parties' national caucuses instead of under the discipline of their 
provincial caucuses or of the provincial legislatures. The practical implication thereof is 
that the Senate has failed to re.tm~~e,nt Pf?Vincial view,s or tQJ2!0rf!Ote inte_!governmental 
r~ons.108 Provincial premiers had to r~grt to various other methods to convey their 
views. The problem with the Senate is that the purpose it was to s~ should first have 
.....___.._ '~~,-·---..-
been determined before the actual comgosjtion was decided. As De Villiers has pointed 
out, it should have been determined whether the Senate i~_,9., gg_-legislator, responsible 
106 Finance Week 9-15 February 1995 5 
107 Building a United Nation - ANC policy proposals for the final Constitution, National Constitutional 
Conference 31 March/1 April 1995 14. 
108 The fact that the provincial representatives were "bullied" at the so-called min-mec meetings made 
proper provincial representation at the highest level even more imperative - Finance Week 9-15 
February 1995 5. 
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for intergovernmental relations, an administrator of national policy or just a sounding 
board.109 
In view of the problems experienced within the Senate and also because of the 
important role that provincial representation has to play within the government's "revised 
understanding" of the provincial framework, 110 it was decided to opt for a provincial 
house where the provinces are represented by members who are elected by the 
respective provincial legislatures. In that way it is envisaged that the provincial house 
will contribute to a more co-operative framework of regional and national governance.111 
It was ultimately decided that the apposite forum in this regard would be a National 
Council of Provinces (NCoP). 
The NCoP is composed of 1 O representatives per province elected by the legislature on 
a proportional basis from its members. Six representatives have "permanent" status 
which means that they must vacate their seats in the provincial legislature.112 The other 
four representatives are called "special delegates" which entails that they could rotate 
depending on what the matter under discussion is. The Premier or a person nominated 
on his/her behalf is one of the four special delegates. The delegates vote en bloc with 
one vote per province if a matter in Schedule 4 is to be decided, while delegates each 
have one vote when matters falling outside the ambit of Schedule 4 are considered. 
The problem is that the NCoP, when viewed from the perspective of the individual 
provinces, will also fail to protect the provincial interests because a political party that 
finds itself in a minority in the Council will simply be outvoted. The situation might 
therefore develop that the NCoP becomes little more than a rubber stamp for the 
majority party of the day. In such a case the structure and functions of the NCoP will 
109 De Villiers Powers 15. 
110 Building a United Nation - ANC policy proposals for the final Constitution op cit 14. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Section 60 of the final Constitution. 
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have to be re-examined by the law makers. 113 Even where a political party is in the 
majority in the NCoP, provincial interests might still suffer in a clash of interests between 
the national and provincial governments because of the possibility of party politics. In 
my opinion the Council of Provinces will protect the interests of the provinces no better 
than the Senate currently does.114 
6 CONCLUSION 
The question whether provincial government in the new South Africa is proving to be, 
or is likely to develop into, workable "quasi-federal" power bases, has both a theoretical 
and a practical/political dimension. If approached from a theoretical viewpoint the 
answer will most probably be in the affirmative. If however approached from a practical 
viewpoint, which I would suggest is obviously the more commendable approach, the 
issue will ultimately be decided by factors which are of a composite (political and 
constitutional) nature. In our political scenario, where the ruling party is in complete 
dominance at the national as well as provincial levels of government, this factor will 
obviously have an even greater effect. The problems which were commented on in 
paragraph 5 above pertain to issues, which if not addressed, will continue to preclude 
a province from reaching full-fledged provincial government status. 
Upon an appraisal of the"quasi-federal" slant of provincial government in South Africa 
two factors really stand out, namely the centralist stance of the ruling party and the 
practical means by which the quest for centralism is to be achieved via the concept of 
"co-operative governance". 115 The term is descriptive of government's intention to create 
113 Financial Mail 1996-05-03 43. 
114 Financial Mail 1996-03-22 46. Given the fact that the NCoP will for the foreseeable future be 
dominated by one party, it is surely not excessively cynical to view it as a mechanism .for 
tightening the central dominance of the government. 
115 Party politics are proving so effective that some of the premiers are now also taking a centralist 
stance - Business Day 1996-02-27 8. 
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strong links between the centre and the regions. 116 Firoz Cachalia explains that the 
concept of "co-operative governance" has certain institutional implications.117 In the first 
instance the provinces will primarily be protected through the structure of national 
government and secondly the concept seeks to reduce the role of judicial supervision 
of the allocation of powers. These implications seem to strengthen the perception that 
the government has a centralist approach to provincial governance.118 
Most if not all of the independent observers agree that we, constitutionally speaking, 
need a federal or "quasi-federal" arrangement for our heterogenous society. However, 
given the lack of respect for the upholding of constitutional concepts that are of critical 
importance to provincial governance, the multitude of problems encountered with 
provincial powers in practice and the government's determined pursuit of the centralist 
policy of co-operative governance, the future prospects for more autonomous provincial 
governments which could in practice function as "quasi-federal" power bases appear to 
be remote and fanciful. 
116 Financial Mail 1996-03-22 46; There have been accusations from political commentators that the 
real intent behind the "co-operative governance" drive was merely to tighten the hold of the ANC 
dominated centre. If the explanation by an ANC member of the concept of co-operative 
governance is anything to go by such apparently cynical reactions may not be totally 
unsubstantiated. 
117 Sunday Times 1995-04-16 16. 
118 The "evidence" pointing to a centralist stance by the ANC is overwhelming - refer to The Star 
1 9 96-10-23 24, Sunday Times 1996-04-28 4; Sunday Times 1996-09-15 1 or any of the other 
articles which deal with the Lekota, Holomisa, Boesak, Shell House or Mahomed incidences. 
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